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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE GARVEE BONDS




On September 24, 2002, the Oklahoma Supreme Court appeared to cause
a lot of important people a lot of trouble. On that day, it issued an opinion in
the awkwardly titled case, In the Matter of the Application of the Oklahoma
Department of Transportation for Approval of Not to Exceed $100 Million;
Oklahoma Department of Transportation Grant Anticipation Notes, Series
2002' (Garvee Bonds). In Garvee Bonds, the court denied the Oklahoma
Department of Transportation's application for approval of $100 million
dollars in Grant Anticipation Notes. These instruments, commonly known as
Garvee bonds, allow the state to borrow money for currently needed highway
improvements, while permitting the bonds to be retired by applying future
federal highway grants (hence the use of the term "anticipation" notes).2
Three different entities of state government, the Contingency Review Board,
the Legislative Bond Oversight Committee, and the Executive Bond Oversight
Committee, whose members include the Governor, the President Pro Tempore
of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House, approved the bonds, which were
intended to finance highway improvements across the state.3 Despite the
political clout urging the issue's approval, the court's decision delayed the
funding of the politically popular highway improvements.
The politicians were not overly concerned by the court's opinion, however.
Governor Keating, for example, described the decision as a "technical
opinion" and moved quickly to remedy its effects.4 The politicians' lack of
concern stemmed from the fact that the Oklahoma legislature provided itself
with an escape hatch in the event the court struck down the statute in question.
The court kindly permitted the use of the legislature's alternative bond
approval process, requiring review of the application by a separately
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for the Study of State Constitutional Law and
Government, Oklahoma City University School of Law. J.D., M.A., University of Chicago;
B.A., Carleton College. The author would like to thank the Kerr Foundation and the OCU Law
Alumni Fund for their support of the research that made this article possible.
1. 2002 OK 74, 64 P.3d 546.
2. Chuck Ervin, Ruling Stalls Road Bonds, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 25, 2002, at A13.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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constituted Council of Bond Oversight (CBO).' The Governor and legislative
leaders immediately announced that they would fill the vacant positions on the
CBO and move to have the applications approved.6 They have, in fact,
quickly made appointments to the CBO, and the bond-issue review process
seemingly has gotten back on track.7
So, was the decision in Garvee Bonds much ado about nothing? It is not
unreasonable to dismiss the effects of the decision as a temporary and
insignificant inconvenience caused by the technical objections of an inveterate
litigant.8 Not unreasonable, but a mistake. For while one can assume that, as
the state's politicians have repeatedly pledged, the state will complete the
projects funded by the bonds, the court's rationale for voiding the bond-review
process may profoundly affect Oklahoma government. In this article, I will
demonstrate that the court's willingness to hold unconstitutional the
legislature's assignment of normally executive functions to committees and
boards - whose membership, in this instance, includes legislators and
legislative appointees - provides hope that the court will more actively police
the separation of powers in the future. In particular, 'it provides hope that the
court will be more likely to prevent the legislature from either granting itself
executive authority or interfering with the executive's legitimately exercised
authority. Active enforcement of separation of powers principles will
significantly compensate for the harm inflicted by one of the most serious
structural flaws of the Oklahoma Constitution - the creation of an executive
branch whose structure and powers make it unlikely that Oklahoma will ever
enjoy effective governance.
In this Article, I will first explain the core problem in judicial enforcement
of the separation of powers and the two most employed approaches to solving
the difficult questions the court faces in this area. I will then turn to the
Garvee Bonds case and explain the problem presented, the court's resolution,
and the court's new approach to separation of powers problems. Finally,
while I will argue that the court reached the correct result, I will critique the
doctrinal foundation of the court's opinion and suggest how the court's
approach can be improved.
5. In re Okla. Dep't of Transp., 138, 64 P.3d at 555.
6. Ervin, supra note 2, at A13.
7. Richard Williamson, After LegalDelays, Oklahoma Sees 4Q Issuance 'Starting to Heat
Up', BOND BUYER, Oct. 21, 2002, at 5. The attorney whose original objection led to the
decision in Garvee Bonds, however, intends to fight the issuance of the bonds until the
Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmatively rules they can be issued. Id.
8. See Richard Williamson, He's at It Again, BOND BUYER, Jan. 14, 2003, at 27. This
perpetual plaintiff has also challenged the Garvee bonds in federal court. Id.
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II. The Core of the Separation of Powers Problem
The theory of separating the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of
government is one of the hallmarks of modern popular government in general,
and American constitutionalism in particular.9 The theory is based on the
profound distrust of human nature and, consequently, human government. 1
0
In the words of Publius: 1
It may be a reflection on human nature that such devices should be
necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is
government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary.
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls
on government would be necessary. In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty
lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. 2
Because human beings cannot be trusted, it is imprudent to allow any of
them unlimited power over the lives of others. In order to render government
safe, one must divide the authority of government in a way that ensures that
no single part of the government accumulates enough power to threaten
liberty. The ancient model of the mixed regime, as articulated by Aristotle
and the British Constitution that inspired liberal political theory, based the
division of political authority on the division of society into monarch,
aristocracy, and common people.'" Such a division was not suitable for
republican America, so the necessary balance had to be based on the
separation of the polity into different functions of government. As Publius,
9. Harvey C. Mansfield, Separation of Powers in the American Constitution, in
SEPARATION OFPOWERS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 5 (Bradford P. Wilson & Peter W. Schramm
eds., 1994).
10. See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 456 (1991).
11. Some commentators, with perhaps some justice, complain that most analyses of
constitutional questions rely upon sources interpreting the U.S. Constitution even when, as does
this article, they deal with matters of state constitutional law. See John Devlin, Toward a State
Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees
Performing Administrative Functions, 66 TEMPLE L. REV. 1205, 1211 (1993). Reliance on The
Federalist, however, should not engender this criticism, as much of its deserved fame lies in the
recognition through the centuries that its defense of the Constitution is rooted not simply in an
authoritative understanding of that particular document, but, instead, reflects a deep
understanding of the nature of popular government itself. See Mansfield, supra note 9, at 4.
12. THE FEDERAUST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
13. Mansfield, supra note 9, at 3-4.
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once again, put succinctly: "No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic
value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty
than that ... [t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether or one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny."' 4 In order to prevent the dangerous accumulation of
power in one person or small group of people, one must first separate power
into different departments and then give "those who administer each
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others."' 5
Separating the different powers of government supports two indispensable
pillars of popular government. First, and most obviously, separation protects
liberty by preventing any one branch from abusing its power; if the President
or Congress are inclined to abuse the rights of citizens, at least one of the
other two branches should possess the power to stop the offending branch. 6
The second, less recognized, structural benefit of separating power is that
constructing the different branches to achieve an optimal balance of powers
and limits enables each branch to accomplish more effectively its special
duties. 7 In other words, a branch specially designed to exercise executive
power, which requires decisive, expeditious action, is more likely to use that
power effectively than a deliberative body such as a legislature.
As important as separating powers is to the constitutional scheme, however,
effective government sometimes requires the creative blending of different
powers into complex political structures designed to solve the most difficult
political problems. Indeed, the Framers of the Constitution themselves chose
not to rest their structural scheme on a simple-minded, strict separation.
Rather, they concluded that unless the different branches are "connected and
blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree
of separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can
never in practice be duly maintained."'" What we today call the "checks and
balances" of the Constitution are really the use of blended powers. 9 For
example, the President's veto is a legislative, not an executive power;
conversely, it can be argued that Senate confirmation of principal executive
officers is a transfer of executive power to the legislature. This blending of
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 12, at 321-22.
16. Mansfield, supra note 9, at 10.
17. Id.
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
19. See James W. Caeser, Doctrines of Presidential-Congressional Relations, in
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, at 95.
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power provides each of the branches the means of defense against the others.
Once possessed of the means, man's normal ambition will supply the motive
to defend himself."0
This need to blend powers seems more necessary in the era of modem
government. The advent of the administrative state, for example, has led to
the extensive blending of powers. It is difficult to imagine how the
government can effectively engage in the kind of close regulation of labor or
environmental conditions so common today, without the executive - or, what
we might call today, the administrative branch of government - issuing rules
that look very much like statutes or making decisions regarding alleged
violations of these rules that appear to all the world as judicial.21 In addition,
as government becomes more complicated and society becomes more
polarized, difficult issues arise that the political system cannot solve because
of entrenched partisan differences, structural flaws, or lack of political will.
Examples of such problems include investigation of possible Presidential
2corruption, systemic budget deficits,23 and inconsistent sentencing practices
by judges.24 In these situations, Congress and the President designed complex
structures employing blended powers to solve the knotty problems at issue.
In each of these cases, a strict separation of powers doctrine would have led
to the voiding of all these structures and the unraveling of the carefully
negotiated political compromise underlying the proposed solution.
The hard and messy truth, then, is that the separation of powers doctrine
must both enforce the boundaries between the different branches and allow for
the necessary blending to make government effective. Clearly, these needs are
in tension, and have led courts to develop seemingly inconsistent lines of
doctrine.25
In some cases, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court, in interpreting the
Federal Constitution, has adopted what is called a "formalist" approach. This
approach seeks to define formal, bright-line rules delineating the different
powers so that courts may identify and strike down the attempts of one branch
to exercise or interfere with the powers of another branch. 26 For example, in
20. THE FEDERAUST No. 51, supra note 12, at 322 ("Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition.").
21. See Devlin, supra note 11, at 1205.
22. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
23. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
24. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
25. One commentator, for example, has stated that "the Supreme Court's treatment of the
constitutional separation of powers is an incoherent muddle." Rebecca L. Brown, Separated
Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1517 (1991).
26. Redish & Cisar, supra note 10, at 453.
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INS v. Chadha," the Court struck down Congress's use of the legislative veto,
holding that Congress violated the requirement that laws must be made
through the formal process of bicameralism and presentment. 28 The Court
rejected arguments, made by Justice White in dissent, that the legislative veto
is a creative and effective solution to the problems to democratic governance
posed by the broad delegations of power to the executive branch necessitated
by the modern administrative state.29 Justice White urged the Court, instead
of viewing the separation of powers as requiring the articulation and
enforcement of what he saw as rigid, formal rules, to accept that "our Federal
Government was intentionally chartered with the flexibility to respond to
contemporary needs without losing sight of fundamental democratic
principles."3 The legislative veto, when understood in the context of the
increased authority provided to the administrative branch by the delegation of
power, "did not alter the division of actual authority between Congress and
the Executive."'" The Court, White urged, should therefore give its
constitutional imprimatur to this new structure because it does not sufficiently
impair the functioning of the respective branches.32
The majority rejected Justice White's plea to make its decision based on
whether the mechanism actually made the Constitution work better; indeed,
it opined that "the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient,
and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not
save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not
the primary objectives - or the hallmarks - of democratic govern-
ment.... .""' The Court found that, despite the utility of the legislative veto,
because "[elxplicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution prescribe
and define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the
legislative process," the Court had no choice but to invalidate the provisions
27. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
28. Id. at 952 (defining making a law as taking action "that had the purpose and effect of
altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons").
29. Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).
Without the legislative veto, Congress is faced with a Hobson's choice: either to
refrain from delegating the necessary authority, leaving itself with a hopeless task
of writing laws with the requisite specificity to cover endless special
circumstances across the entire policy landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate
its lawmaking function to the executive branch and independent agencies.
Id.
30. Id. at 978 (White., J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 994 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 995 (White, J. dissenting).
33. Id. at 944.
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at issue.3 Thus, in order to employ the formalist approach, the Court must
possess confidence that it can define and apply formal categories of power to
decide cases.
In other cases, the Court has applied an entirely different approach, one
founded more on Justice White's approach in Chadha than on that of the
majority. In Morrison v. Olson,35 the Court considered the constitutionality
of the independent counsel established to investigate the President and other
executive officers. It appeared clear that the independent counsel established
by Congress must violate any formalist understanding of the Constitution; the
independent counsel exercised the most traditional and obvious of executive
powers, the power of prosecution, and this prosecutor was neither appointed
nor truly supervised by the executive, and could only be removed by the
Attorney General for cause.36
The Court rejected the arguments that the case could be settled by the
application of a formalist test, holding, for example, on the challenge to the
limitations on the removal power, that the "analysis contained in our removal
cases is designed not to define rigid categories. 37 Instead, the Court ruled
that in the separation of powers case, two questions must be asked: first, does
the structure or law at issue impermissibly impede the ability of another
branch to carry out its constitutional functions?; 38 and second, does the
challenged practice involve the attempt of one branch to increase its powers
at the expense of another branch?39
In asking these questions, the Court rejected the formalist notion that
separation of powers cases can be decided by defining and applying formal
categories; rather, it adopted a functionalist approach to these problems that
requires a close analysis of the particular facts of the case and examines
whether the challenged practice overly interferes with the workings of another
branch or gives too much power to another branch.' Under a functionalist
approach, these questions are of degree, not kind. This approach, therefore,
provides courts with far more flexibility in analyzing separation of powers
questions; it can approve new structures that blend and rearrange the powers
of different branches, as long as the new practice does not interfere too much
with one of the branches or give too much power to another. A formalist
34. Id. at 945.
35. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
36. See id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 689.
38. Id. at 691 ("[T]he real question is whether the removal restrictions are of such a nature
that they impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty ... .
39. See id. at 692-93.
40. See Devlin, supra note 11, at 1213-14.
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approach, in contrast, is not concerned with matters of degree; once one
branch invades the province of another, the practice must be struck down.
The Court has not exclusively adopted either approach, using one in some
cases and the other in different cases." The state supreme courts have also
used both approaches, albeit formulated in various ways, in interpreting the
separation of powers provisions in their constitutions.42 It seems obvious that
the decision of whether to adopt one approach or the other - or to continue
to waver between both - is one of the most difficult, and important, questions
of constitutional interpretation. The question of which approach to adopt was
at the heart of the Garvee Bonds case.
III. The Garvee Bonds Case: Analysis and Critique
A. The Question
The Garvee Bonds case presented a classic separation of powers problem.
In 1987, the Oklahoma Legislature decided to reform the process of the
issuance of bonds by state government entities by establishing a process for
"significant systematic oversight."43 However, rather than delegating the
power to issue bonds to purely executive officers or entities, or writing
detailed rules governing the issuance of bonds, the legislature constructed a
creative mechanism to ensure both legislative and executive review of the
bond issuance process.
The legislature established two separate committees to carry out the desired
oversight. First, it established the Legislative Bond Oversight Committee
(LBOC), comprising six members, three appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and three by the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate." Second, it established the Executive Bond Oversight Board (EBOC),
consisting of the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Director of the
Oklahoma Department of Commerce, and two other members appointed by
41. Redish & Cisar, supra note 10, at 450.
In the separation of powers area, however, the modem Court has evinced
something of a split personality, seemingly wavering from resort to judicial
enforcement with a formalistic vengeance to use of a so-called "functional"
approach that appears to be designed to do little more than rationalize incursions
by one branch of the federal government into the domain of another.
Id.
42. See Devlin, supra note 11, at 1246-47.
43. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 695.2 (Supp. 2003); In re the Application of the Okla. Dep't of
Transp., 2002 OK 74, 1 14, 64 P.3d 546, 551.
44. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 695.4 (Supp. 2003). While the statute does not require that the
Speaker or the President Pro Tempore appoint legislators, all the members at the time of the case
were legislators. In re Okla. Dep't of Transp., 115, 64 P.3d at 551.
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the Governor.45 The statutory scheme provides that all bond obligations
issued by any state government entity must be approved by a majority of both
the LBOC and the EBOC.
46
The legislature added an additional wrinkle to this scheme when, in 2000,
it passed a bill authorizing the Oklahoma Department of Transportation
(ODOT) to issue Garvee bonds. The bill amended a statute establishing a
$700 millionroad improvement program; the amendment provided that ODOT
"may issue Grant Anticipation Notes" if the issue was unanimously approved
by the Contingency Review Board (CRB).47 The CRB consists of three voting
members: the Governor, the Speaker of the House, and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate.48 It functions primarily to review requests for addi-
tional state government personnel or funds in case of an emergency that could
not be foreseen during the preceding legislative session.4 9
In early 2002, proceeding according to this statutory scheme, ODOT, after
receiving authorization from the Oklahoma Transportation Commission,
sought approval for the issuance of Garvee bonds in an amount not to exceed
$100 million." On February 1, 2002, the CRB gave the requisite unanimous
approval, followed by the approval of both the EBOC and LBOC on February
28, 2002.5' Having secured the necessary approvals, ODOT filed an
application with the Oklahoma Supreme Court seeking a determination that
the bonds were authorized in accordance with law and, if issued, were valid.
At that point, a protest was filed to the application, requesting that the court
deny the application because the statutory scheme authorizing the issue was
constitutionally flawed.52
The protestor alleged, not surprisingly, that the statutory scheme violated
the separation of powers principles of the Oklahoma Constitution. In
particular, the protestor contended that the role of both the LBOC and the
CRB in the bond review process violated the state constitution because, with
regard to both entities, members of the legislature unconstitutionally exercised
45. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 695.5 (2001).
46. Id. § 695.9(A).
47. 69 OKLA. STAT. § 2001(E)(2) (2001).
48. Id. § 3605. The Director of State Finance is an ex officio non-voting member.
49. 74 OKLA. STAT. § 3603 (2001).
50. In re the Application of the Okla. Dep't of Transp., 2002 OK 74, 1 1,64 P.3d 546, 548.
51. Id. 13, 64 P.3d at 548.
52. Id. IN 6-7, 64 P.3d at 549.
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executive powers. 3 The case, then, squarely required the court to decide and
articulate its doctrinal approach to separation of powers questions.
B. The Solution
In resolving this important question, the court received minimal guidance
from the text of the constitution and its precedent. Article 4, Section 1 of the
Oklahoma Constitution states that:
The powers of the government of the State of Oklahoma shall be
divided into three separate departments: The Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial; and except as provided in this Constitu-
tion, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of
government shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall
exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others. 4
This language does not resolve the question of whether a branch in a particular
case is exercising a power that properly belongs to it or to another branch.
Precedent was only marginally more helpful to the court. As might be
expected, given the judicial struggle with interpretation of the Federal
Constitution, the court, in interpreting the state's constitution, has wavered to
some degree between a formalist and functionalist approach to understanding
the separation of powers. For example, in a 1981 case, the court employed
formalist rhetoric, stating that "[liegislative, as distinguished from executive,
power is the authority to make law, but not to execute it or to appoint agents
charged with the duty of enforcement. The latter is purely an executive
function."55  This reasoning suggests that the court is comfortable with
defining and enforcing categories of power.
Three years later, however, the court made functionalist noises, opining
that:
The true import of the doctrine of separation of powers is that the
whole power of one department shall not be exercised by the same
hands which possess the whole power of either of the other
53. Id. The protestor also contended that the legislators, by serving on the LBOC and the
CRB, were holding both legislative and executive offices in violation of the constitution. The
court, because it struck down the scheme on separation of powers grounds, did not consider the
dual office argument. Id. 17 n.10, 64 P.3d at 549 n.10.
54. OKLA. CONST. art. 4, § 1.
55. Tweedy v. Okla. Bar Ass'n, 1981 OK 12, 1 9, 624 P.2d 1049, 1054 (holding that a
court could not order a re-investigation of a disciplinary grievance filed against an attorney
because this order was inconsistent with the courts' role as the sole and final tribunal for the
adjudication of these grievances).
336 [Vol. 56:327
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departments; and that no one department ought to possess directly
or indirectly an overruling influence over the others.56
This language suggests, as a functionalist would argue, that the question of
whether separation of powers principles have been violated is one of degree,
not kind. One branch may legitimately exercise some of the power that
normally belongs to another branch, but not so much that it exercises either
the whole power of another branch, or enough of the power that the losing
branch is excessively impeded in carrying out its mandated functions. This
approach certainly does not rely on the definition and firm policing of hard
and fast boundaries between the branches. In sum, given the importance of
the doctrinal question and the failure to articulate a clear approach to that
point, the issue of the preferred approach to separation of powers problems
under the Oklahoma Constitution was ripe for decision in Garvee Bonds.
The court came down strongly and clearly on the side of the functionalist
approach. The court stated that "there can be blending of the three powers of
government" and that "it is not always possible to contain the three branches
of government."57 The problems of modem government, particularly the
administrative state, "make it more difficult to neatly classify the function and
make the application of the formalistic approach to separation of powers
issues more problematic.""8
In articulating its functionalist approach, however, the court did not rely
upon the general pronouncements in its previous opinions. It instead turned
to a test articulated by the Kansas Supreme Court in Schneider v. Bennett,59
in which the Kansas court, in terms quite similar to those used in the
functionalist opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court,' concluded that "to have
a usurpation of powers there must be a significant interference by one
department with the operations of another.",6' While acknowledging that
others may be considered in future cases, Bennett set out four factors it
considered particularly important in the analysis of these questions:
First is the essential nature of the power being exercised. Is the
power exclusively executive or legislative or is it a blend of the
56. York v. Turpen, 1984 OK 26, 9, 681 P.2d 763, 767 (citation omitted). The court,
quite early on, it should be noted, had evinced functionalist leanings, stating in Bailey v. State
Board of Public Affairs, 1944 OK 301,l 13, 153 P.2d 235, 239, "[t]hat there may be a certain
degree of blending of the three powers of government is well recognized."
57. In re Okla. Dep't of Transp. 110, 64 P.3d at 550.
58. Id.
59. 547 P.2d 786 (Kan. 1976).
60. See Devlin, supra note 11, at 1213 n.27 (citing several cases, including Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) and Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)).
61. Bennett, 547 P.2d at 792.
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two? A second factor is the degree of control by the legislative
department in the exercise of the power. Is there a coercive
influence or a mere cooperative venture? A third consideration of
importance is the nature of the objective sought to be obtained by
the legislature. Is the intent of the legislature to cooperate with the
executive by furnishing some special expertise of one or.more of
its members or is the objective of the legislature obviously one of
establishing its superiority over the executive department in an area
essentially executive in nature? A fourth consideration could be
the practical result of the blending of powers as shown by actual
experience over a period of time where such evidence is
available.62
The court in Garvee Bonds adopted and applied the Bennett test as its
own.63 It first applied the test to the challenge to the constitutionality of the
LBOC. The court asked whether the power to approve or disapprove the
issuance of bonds was a purely legislative or executive power.64 The court
found that "the LBOC exercised a power that cannot be classified as purely
legislative, because it is beyond the Legislature's fundamental role to make
the law. ' 65 It concluded that the power to issue bonds is essentially one of
carrying out legislative policy, not making it, and therefore the LBOC - a
body of legislators - exercised primarily executive or administrative
powers.66 It is worth noting that if the court applied a formalist test, this
finding alone would void the law; the court, however, pressed on.
The court then considered the second factor, the degree of control exercised
by the legislative body over the executive branch. 67 The court, noting that the
LBOC is an exclusively legislative body and that it holds a veto over an
essentially executive function, concluded that "the LBOC is a vehicle by
which the executive department is being subjected to the coercive influence
of the legislative department. "68
Finally, the court considered the third factor, asking whether, in
establishing the LBOC, the legislature intended to cooperate with the
executive by furnishing, for example, special expertise, or, instead, if it
intended to establish legislative superiority over an essentially executive
62. Id.
63. In re Okla. Dep't of Transp., In 16-21, 64 P.3d at 551-52.
64. Id.1 16, 64 P.3d at 551.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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function.69 The court found that the legislation establishing the LBOC did not
require its members to possess any special expertise regarding the issuance of
bonds; its only role was to control the bond approval process." The
combination of this lack of expertise with the fact that, while not required, the
LBOC was made up entirely of legislators, "evince[d] a motive to retain
legislative control over the note-approval process."'"
Examining the three factors together, the court concluded that the power
"wielded by . . . the LBOC is potentially coercive and may constitute a
significant interference with the executive branch in the note-approval
process."72 Because the LBOC, in effect, operated as "a mini-legislature,"
controlling the note-approval process, it constituted "a usurpation by the
Legislature of the powers of the executive branch and violates Oklahoma's
constitutional separation of powers provision."73
Two facts complicated the court's analysis of the challenge to the CRB.
First, the Governor served as one of the three voting members of the body.
Second, decisions of the CRB regarding the issuance of Garvee bonds require
unanimity.74 Therefore, on the surface, it appears the Governor possesses
equal authority as the two other members of the CRB, the Speaker of the
House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. The problem with this
analysis is that, as the court noted regarding the LBOC, the decision to
approve the bonds is essentially an executive matter. The fact that the state's
two highest legislators possess a veto over the bond issuance process provides
the legislature "a significant degree of control over an executive function."75
The motive for the legislative injection of the CRB into the bond issuance
process is as suspicious as its devising and staffing of the LBOC. The CRB' s
main function is to approve emergency funding requests; nothing about the
purpose of its existence, its design, or its membership suggests any special
expertise regarding the issuance of bonds.76 Certainly, the CRB was not
involved in the review of bond issues to give the Governor more authority
over these decisions; he already serves on, and theoretically controls the
EBOC through his appointments. The only explanation for including the CRB
69. Id. 1 18, 64 P.3d at 551. The court did not consider the fourth factor, the practical
effect shown by experience over time, because there was no relevant historical experience to
analyze in this case. Id. 120, 64 P.3d at 552.
70. Id. 118, 64 P.3d at 551.
71. Id. 1 19, 64 P.3d at 552.
72. Id. 21, 64 P.3d at 552.
73. Id.
74. Id. 1 23, 64 P.3d at 552.
75. Id.
76. Id. 24, 64 P.3d at 552.
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in this process is to provide the Speaker of the House and the President Pro
Tempore a veto regarding the issuance of Garvee bonds." The court
concluded that the power wielded by the two legislators in the bond review
process "is potentially coercive and may constitute a significant interference
with the executive branch;" this statutory scheme therefore "constitutes a
usurpation by the Legislature of the powers of the executive branch and
violates Oklahoma's constitutional separation of powers provision.""8
What, then, is the significance of the Court's opinion in Garvee Bonds?
First, and most obviously, the Court made clear, in adopting the Bennett test,
that it will use a functionalist approach when analyzing separation of powers
problems. Theoretically, this choice should provide the other two branches
of government, particularly the legislature, more freedom to create structures
that blend different powers. At the very least, a functionalist approach
commits the court to scrutinize closely the practical effects of such blending,
rather than simply rejecting these attempts because the legislature has crossed
some abstract line.
While this first implication of Garvee Bonds may encourage the legislature
to take greater liberties with the separation of powers, it should also take heed
of the second important lesson of Garvee Bonds; the court is willing, in
applying its new test, to strike down the actions of the other branches when
they exceed their authority. Indeed, advocates ofjudicially enforced, rigorous
separation of power limits on the political branches, who generally support the
formalist approach, should find hope not only in the result of Garvee Bonds,
77. Id.
78. Id. 26, 64 P.3d at 553. The court then considered whether the unconstitutional
provisions regarding the LBOC and CRB were severable from the remainder of the bond review
process. Id. 1I 27-31, 64 P.3d at 553-54. The court concluded that "the Legislature would
have, in the event that the LBOC was found unconstitutional, enacted the remainder of the Bond
Oversight and Reform Act without the LBOC and clearly intended the remaining, non-offending
language of the [Act] to stand alone." Id. 128,64 P.3d at 553. The court further found that the
CRB provision was subject to a statutory presumption that it too was severable and that the
presumption was not overcome in this case. Id. 131, 64 P.3d at 554; see 75 OKLA. STAT. § 1 la
(2001). The legislature buttressed the court's conclusions by including an alternate review
process in the event the court struck down its existing provisions. The legislature provided that
"[iln the event either the Executive or Legislative Bond Oversight Commission is found
unconstitutional ... all of the powers, duties and responsibilities of the Commissions shall
devolve upon the Council of Bond Oversight." 62 OKLA. STAT. § 695.11 A(A) (2001). This
Council consists of five non-legislative members, one appointed by the Speaker of the House,
one by the President Pro Tempore, two by the Governor with advice and consent of the Senate,
and one shall be the Director of State Finance. Id. § 695.11 A(B). The court finally concluded
that, for the notes presented in the application to be issued, approval must be secured from the
Council of Bond Oversight; once that approval is secured, the application may be presented to
the courts for approval. In re Okla. Dep't of Transp.,1 34, 64 P.3d at 554-55.
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but in some of the court's reasoning. While the court clearly adopted the
functionalist approach, the court relied on formalist reasoning in applying that
test and invalidating the legislature's bond review scheme. If used in future
cases, such reasoning could result in a quite robust separation of powers
doctrine.
The court turned to formalist arguments when it asked, in applying the first
factor of the Bennett test, whether the powers exercised by the challenged
entity were primarily legislative or executive.79 The court answered this
question by supplying a definition - a formal category - of executive
power, stating that executive power "involves carrying out legislative policy
and applying it to varying conditions."' Once the court determined that the
legislature had involved itself in an essentially executive function, it placed
a heavy burden on the legislature to demonstrate that it had some special
reason for injecting itself into this function. The legislature failed to meet this
burden and, as it is difficult to envision what special expertise legislators
possess regarding executive functions, seldom could it. The court, in effect,
has infused formalist steel into its flexible, functionalist doctrine. This
increased rigor may result in a legislature more cautious about grasping the
power of other branches.
C. A Critique
From the perspective of someone who supports more rigorous enforcement
of separation of powers principles in Oklahoma, Garvee Bonds certainly
represents a move in the right direction. While the court made some progress,
however, it squandered an opportunity to do much more. The court provided
some hope that it would curb future legislative abuses in applying its newly
adopted functionalist doctrine, but it would have better served the cause of
effective separation of powers if it had articulated clear-cut, formal rules
curbing legislative violations of the separation of powers, particularly the
legislative proclivity for directly usurping executive authority.
79. Id. 1 16, 64 P.3d at 551.
80. Id. In making this distinction, one more consistent with formalist than functionalist
thinking, the court hearkened back to earlier cases where it was more confident about drawing
these kinds of formal lines. See City of Sand Springs v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 1980 OK 36,
12, 608 P.2d 1139, 1146.
This Court has committed itself to the proposition that the essence of the
legislative function is the determination of policy; indeed, the dichotomy between
administrative acts and legislative acts hinges upon the declaration of policy,
which is a legislative function, and the implementation of that policy, which is
traditionally an administrative function.
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In order to appreciate the importance of reining in legislative usurpation,
one must first understand the importance of a strong executive to a well-
functioning popular government. The Federalist offers the best explanation
of this political truth. In the words of Hamilton, "A feeble executive implies
a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another
phrase for a bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be
in theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.",8 ' Good government
requires a strong executive because the executive supplies energy to
government.82 Energy is the virtue that enables a person or organization to
accomplish tasks great and small; we all know the difference between working
with someone who is energetic and productive and someone who is lethargic.83
Hamilton called the defining characteristic of an energetic executive
"unity. '  Put simply, the executive branch possesses energy only when
power is lodged in one person, as with the presidency. The decisive, swift,
and energetic action necessary to good government is far more likely to be
taken when power is granted to one individual, rather than several.8 5 Unity,
and the practical advantages it supplies, ensures that the executive can
effectively defend himself and his branch from the attempted usurpations of
the other branches.86 In addition, because the President alone is responsible
for the actions of the executive branch, the people can hold him accountable
for any failures in administration.8 7 This unity - and, consequently, the
effectiveness of government - is destroyed when more than one person
possesses executive power or when others control the executive's authority.
The Framers of the Oklahoma Constitution, and the political leaders that
have succeeded them unfortunately have ignored Publius's counsel. Rather
than creating a strong, effective unitary executive branch, the state
constitution establishes a plural executive with eleven separately elected
executive officers, all of whom may pursue different policies if they wish. 8
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
82. Id. ("Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government.").
83. Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK.
L. REV. 23, 37 (1995) ("The Framers of the Constitution of 1787 believed adamantly that some
degree of energy was absolutely vital both to good government generally and to good execution
of the laws in particular.").
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, supra note 81, at 424.
85. Id. ("Decisioni activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the
proceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater
number ... ").
86. Calabresi, supra note 83, at 37.
87. Id.
88. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON GOV'T PERFORMANCE. STATE OFOKLA.. A GOVERNMENT AS
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To make matters worse, the legislature has placed much of the executive
power that remains not in the hands of an already weak Governor and his
chosen cabinet, but instead in the hands of more than 300 boards,
commissions, agencies, and other state entities, many of which are not directly
responsible to the Governor. This executive structure makes it difficult both
for the Governor to manage the state effectively and for the people to hold him
accountable for poor performance by government.89 It is no coincidence that
three separate studies on reform of the Oklahoma Constitution and Oklahoma
government conducted since 1990 have recommended executive branch
reform in general and strengthening of the authority of the Governor in
particular.9"
If the Oklahoma Constitution is going to function as well as possible in its
current form, it is vital that the court, in interpreting the separation of powers
provisions of the document, do all that it can to preserve the little executive
authority that remains in the system. How might it go about accomplishing
this task? It can take guidance from what some commentators might consider
an unlikely source - the U.S. Supreme Court. For all the loose academic talk
about the incoherence of the Court's separation of powers doctrine, 9' the
pattern of the Court's decisions reveals a distinct and sensible logic - one
that the Oklahoma Supreme Court should follow in interpreting the state
constitution.
The heart of the academic critique of federal separation of powers
jurisprudence is the criticism of the Court's wavering between the formalist
and the functionalist approaches.92 The Court, however, may appear more
inconsistent than it is. While it is true that the Court uses both approaches,
there is a discernable pattern to the cases involving the formalist approach.
The Court employs this approach when the legislature seeks to directly
exercise purely executive powers. In other words, when the legislature itself
exercises executive functions, as opposed to assigning executive functions to
GOOD AS OUR PEOPLE 11 (1995).
89. Id. at 9. For a critique of the structure of the executive branch in Oklahoma, see
Andrew C. Spiropoulos, It All Starts At the Top: Reforming Oklahoma's Executive Branch, in
OKLAHOMA POuCY BLUEPRINT 111-25 (2003).
90. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON GOv'T PERFORMANCE, supra note 88, at 9-16; OKLA.
ACADEMY FOR STATE GOALS, BACK TO THE FUTURE: TRANSFORMING OKLAHOMA'S ANTIQUATED
STATE CONSTITUTION 9-12 (2002); see also Danney Goble, The Constitution of the State of
Oklahoma: RecommendationsforRevision, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 515,562-70(1991). The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma scuttled the 1990 attempt at reform by its decision in In re
Initiative Petition No. 344, State Question No. 630, 1990 OK 75, 797 P.2d 326.
91. See Devlin, supra note 11, at 1214 ("The Court's reasoning and results have been
variously described as 'an incoherent muddle,' 'abysmal,' and a 'mess."').
92. See supra text accompanying notes 26-42.
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another branch or to an independent entity, the Court categorically denies the
legislature the authority to exercise that power.
Three illustrations prove the point. First, in Buckley v. Valeo,93 the Court
held, by a formalist interpretation of the Appointments Clause of Article 1l, 9
that the legislature could not, under any circumstances, appoint officers of the
United States, finding that
all officers of the United States are to be appointed in accordance
with the [Appointments] Clause. Principal officers are selected by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Inferior
officers Congress may allow to be appointed by the President
alone, by the heads of departments, or by the Judiciary. No class
or type of officer is excluded because of its special functions.95
Second, the Court, in Bowsher v. Synar,9 held that Congress may never
give itself the power to remove an officer performing executive functions; the
Court stated its conclusion quite categorically:
[W]e conclude that Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of
removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except
by impeachment. To permit the execution of the laws to be vested
in an officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical
terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws.
... The structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to
execute the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an
officer under its control what it does not possess.97
Lastly, in Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc.,98 in which a Board of Review composed of
nine members of Congress was vested with veto power over the board of
directors of the authority that manages the capital's two airports, the Court
held that members of Congress were flatly prohibited from exercising
executive power.99 The Court concluded that, to prevent legislative
encroachment upon the executive branch, Congress must obey the "basic"
93. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
94. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
95. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132. The Court remarked that nothing in its opinion should be
held to deny Congress the power to appoint its own officers. Id. at 128.
96. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
97. Id. at 726.
98. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
99. Id. at 255, 274.
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restraint that "[i]t may not 'invest itself or its Members with either executive
power or judicial power.""'
It is clear, then, that the Court has constructed a set of high, formal barriers
around the exercise of purely executive powers. The Court has decided that
under no circumstances will legislators be allowed to: (1) appoint officers who
exercise executive functions; (2) remove these officers; or (3) exercise
executive functions themselves. The authors of The Federalist would applaud
the Court's strict, formal approach to these questions because they made clear
that the legislature should be the branch weighed down with the most
restrictions because it was the one most to be feared. The Framers urged that
in a representative democracy, because the "legislative department is
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its
impetuous vortex,"'' it is "against the enterprising ambition of this
department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all
their precautions. ' 2  Because in a popular government the legislature
"necessarily predominates," one must remember that "the weakness of the
executive may require... that it should be fortified."'0 3 Courts can fortify the
executive by enforcing strict rules against the legislature directly exercising
executive functions.t14
In Garvee Bonds, the Oklahoma Supreme Court should have followed its
federal brethren in enacting formal barriers against legislative usurpation.
While the Court reached the same result as the federal cases, its purely
functionalist approach fails to provide the strong protection for the executive
branch afforded by the federal doctrine. The surest way for the Oklahoma
court to fulfill its professed intention to prevent the legislative usurpation of
powers is to establish firm and clear rules forbidding the legislature from
100. Id. at 274 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406
(1928)). Certainly, the application of such a rule would have made Garvee Bonds a much
simpler decision.
101. THE FEDERAUSTNO. 48, supra note 18, at 309.
102. Id.
103. THE FEDERAUST No. 51, supra note 12, at 322-23.
104. John Devlin argues that state constitutions differ from the Federal Constitution in
important respects and, therefore, with regard to separation of powers questions, should be
interpreted differently. Devlin, supra note 11, at 1226-27. State constitutions, for example, are
based on the fundamental principle that the legislature, in contrast to the enumerated powers of
Congress, possesses plenary power, so that it may exercise a power unless affirmatively limited
by the constitution. Id. at 1226. Many state constitutions, like Oklahoma's, also establish a
plural, rather than unitary, executive. Id. at 1226-27. These structural differences, however,
make it more imperative that courts aggressively police separation of powers violations. If
Madison is correct that the danger of legislative abuse is inherent in the nature of popular
government, then the fact that state legislators are comparatively more powerful than Congress
should lead courts to supervise them even more closely.
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exercising core executive powers. If it is serious about invigorating the
separation of powers in Oklahoma, the court should modify its doctrine to
prevent the legislature from appointing executive officials, removing them, or
giving its own members direct executive powers.' 05
Some may argue that the court, as it did in Garvee Bonds, may provide the
same protection using a functionalist approach. This argument presents two
problems. First, if the court continues to apply a flexible, functionalist rule
in evaluating legislative encroachments on core executive powers, no
guarantee exists that future courts will not mistakenly use this flexibility to
allow the legislature to gut the powers of the executive. Certainly the history
and practice of Oklahoma government to date fails to instill a great deal of
confidence that an appreciation of the importance of a strong executive
permeates the legal and political culture of the state.
Second, articulating strong formal rules against the usurpation of the
powers of another branch has a great value, aside from facilitating the judicial
invalidation of legislative overreaching. The fact of the matter is that, given
the protean nature of political power, members of one branch can accumulate
dangerous powers over time without the other branches noticing it. Worse
yet, when the other branches notice the danger, they may not be able to either
remedy the harm already caused or effectively stop the now all-powerful
branch from abusing its powers."° To prevent one branch, particularly the
dangerous legislature, from accumulating these powers over time, the court
must articulate and enforce prophylactic rules against the first encroachment
upon the powers of another branch, even if that encroachment seems small or
especially useful under the circumstances.'07 These rules prevent the problem
from even arising, creating what two commentators call a "buffer zone"
between the legitimate interaction and competition between the branches and
the dangerous accumulation of powers in one branch.'08
What then of the legitimate need for experimentation and innovation in
government? Will these formal rules prevent government from finding ways
105. The problem of legislators directly exercising executive powers could be addressed by
a robust interpretation of the state constitution's ineligibility clauses. For example, article 5,
section 18 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "No person shall serve as
a member of the Legislature who is, at the time of such service, an officer of the United States
or State government.. .. " See OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 18; see also id. art. 5, § 23.
106. Redish & Cisar, supra note 10, at 464 ("[S]hort of an overt coup, such accretion [of
power] need not be - indeed, is unlikely to be - of a dramatic form. Rather, it may be almost
microscopic, so that the naked eye will be unable to perceive its occurrence.").
107. Id. at 463 ("[Tlhe separation of powers must operate in a prophylactic manner - in
other words, as a means of preventing a situation in which one branch has acquired a level of
power sufficient to allow it to subvert popular sovereignty and individual liberty.").
108. Id. at 476.
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to solve new and difficult problems using the blending of powers? Not at all.
I simply suggest that the court adopt formal rules regarding a limited number
of legislative encroachments on the executive branch. The court's application
of its functionalist doctrine to the myriad of separation of powers problems
will provide it enough flexibility to approve those structures and innovations
it believes do not practically threaten the balance between the branches.
Finally, the legislature will not lose the power it needs to do its job. In any
representative democracy, the power to make the laws - the power to
establish the policy of the government - is the most powerful tool available
and is generally sufficient to protect the legislature from any threat from either
of the two branches. For example, if the legislature disapproves of how the
executive administers the bond issuance or any other program, it may add
detailed rules instructing the executive or the judiciary precisely how the
program should be run. If worse comes to worse, it can always abolish the
program.
Aside from possessing the power to make laws, the legislature greatly
influences the other branches. 9 For example, it exercises an oversight
function over the administrative branch, allowing it to hold executive officials
publicly accountable. Finally, the legislature can always use its second
biggest club - the power over appropriations. If a recalcitrant executive
branch fails to heed the legislature's directions or scolding, it can be deprived
of the funds necessary to operate. In sum, the legislature can always protect
itself. It is the other branches that need protection.
109. John Devlin makes the interesting argument that the normal tools employed by
legislatures to check the executive, such as the oversight power, are less effective in state
governments because state legislatures often do not possess the same resources as Congress.
Devlin, supra note 11, at 1228. For example, state legislators often must do their work in short
sessions, serve only part-time, and lack adequate staff and budgets. Id. at 1228-29. While much
of this is true, none of it justifies legislatures making short shrift of the separation of powers in
order to effectively do theirjobs. As the Court stated when it struck down the scheme placing
members of Congress on the Washington area airports' authority Board of Review, Congress
may not exercise real power in structures outside the normal legislative process because, "[i]f
the power is executive, the Constitution does not permit an agent of Congress to exercise it. If
the power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of [the Constitution]." Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for
the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 276 (1991). Indeed, much of the
legislative usurpations of executive power, such as the establishing of permanent legislative
oversight committees with veto power over executive decisions are merely ways of avoiding the
difficult work of modernizing and reforming state governments so they work more effectively.
This work must be done if the public is to gain a confidence it does not now possess in the
institutional capacity of state governments. See G. Alan Tarr, The State of State Constitutions,
62 LA. L. REv. 3, 5 (2001).
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IV. Conclusion
Those who hope for improved governance in Oklahoma should see Garvee
Bonds as an opportunity lost and found. It was an opportunity lost because
the Oklahoma Supreme Court could have taken the legislature's obvious
usurpation of power as the occasion for the pronouncement of a strong and
clear set of rules that could prevent such abuses in the future. The court
instead chose to provide itself the most flexibility, at the cost of a lack of
direction for the branches. The opportunity found, though, was in the court's
willingness to use its authority to stop legislative usurpation of executive
power. Whatever approach the court applies to these questions in the future,
it should continue to take seriously both its role as the guardian of the
Oklahoma Constitution and as the catalyst for positive change in Oklahoma
governance.
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